George W. Flick v. Glen Van Tassell and Van\u27s Service, Inc : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1976
George W. Flick v. Glen Van Tassell and Van's
Service, Inc : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce Findlay; Nielsen, Conder, Henroid and Gottfredson; Attorneys for Respondent.
Craig S Cook; Michael R Carlston; Worsley, Snow, and Christensen; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Flick v. Van Tassell, No. 14154.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/252




ohr i / r j , j 
BftlGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
0r* -..V 
"VATE OJ- LVAH 
GEORGE W. FLICK, 
P] ai nti ff and Respondei 11 :, 
vs . 
GLEN VAN TASSELL a n d VAN'S 
SERVICE, I N C . , a ^'<.-x-\ c o r :x • i\x t.. 
D e f e n d a n t s a n d A p p e l l a n t s . 
C a s e No. 
14154 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
A p p e a l from Lhe J u d g m e n t o f t h e S e c o n d J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r D a v i s C o u n t y , t h e H o n o r a b l e R o n a l d 
0 . H y d e , J u d g e . 
C r a i g S . Cook 
M i c h a e 1 R. Ca r ] s t o n 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
A t t o r n e y s f o r A p p e l l a n t s 
701 C o n t i n e n t a l Bank B u i l d i n g 
S a l t L a k e Ci t y , U t a h 8 4 1 0 1 
B r u c e F i n d l a y 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD ft.- GOTTPRKOSOI I 
A t t o r n e y s f o r R e s p o n d e n t s 
1 ! u Newhou^e ivi . id:u; ' [ 
3 a I f". I.-.UKL: -J . : ;- - ' •'' •-:: 
: A 1 1 ^ MAR 2 i ) ' iy/b \\:<\\ u 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. FLICK, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs • 
Civil No. 14154 
GLEN VAN TASSELL, and VAN'S 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
'POINT ONE. A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED TO 
"APPELLANT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS COURT MIS-
CONCEIVED THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF BEING SOUGHT 
AND IN LIGHT OF RECENT OPINIONS OF THIS COURT 
GRANTING RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENTS. 
The opinion of this court filed March 5, 1976 suc-
cinctly states the facts of this appeal. The dates cited 
by the court are correct since they give the chronology 
of the events starting from the Notice of Appeal to the 
date of Argument. However, if there is any implied im-
pression that a delay occurred in the prosecution of this 
appeal, it must be remembered that appellant's former 
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counsel controlled the appeal up until the first of 
February, 1976 when appellant's present counsel entered 
its appearance. Thus, any delay in the appellate process 
was caused by appellant's former counsel just as the fail-
ure in the lower court to answer the interrogatories and 
appear at trial was caused by the advice and conduct of 
such counsel. 
Appellant believes that this court's opinion concerning 
general rules of law as to matters beyond the record is ab-
solutely correct and should be applied in 99% of any cases 
where the record is to be supplemented. However, this case 
is in the 1% exception where the court's equity power must 
be applied. The reason for this exception is simple: when 
a fraud or perpetration of a fraud is committed at the lower 
court level and at the same time the record of the lower 
court is established by the perpetrators, it is only 
logical that the record will be devoid of any showing of 
this wrongful conduct. This, of course, could only occur 
when the acts or omissions were made by the trial attor-
neys or the trial court who can effectively prevent the 
record from revealing the true nature of any malpractice 
or misfeasance. In this case, for example, the trial court 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was perfectly justified in ruling as it did with the record 
which was presented before it by the perpetrator of the 
fraud and misrepresentation. It was only after the defen-
dant consulted with new counsel who was not a party to 
this gross neglect and malpractice that the errors could 
be raised and supplemented into the record. 
This court in its opinion continually states that 
allowing affidavits of "losers" to supplement the record 
would destroy the sanctity of a judgment. This too is a 
correct statement that should be applied in the large 
majority of cases. So too, this Court states that such 
affidavits without the benefit of "cross examination" or 
an "evidentiary hearing" would be a miscarriage of justice 
and could allow a litigant to complain about his counsel 
after a bad result was obtained and procure himself a 
new trial. Appellant has no argument with these state-
ments . 
Two things should be considered in this particular 
case, however. First, the case involved a default judgment 
where the litigant, John Van Tassell, never once personally 
appeared before the trial court so that any representations 
or failures to appear were performed solely by his counsel. 
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Second, defendant is not appealling from the judgment itself 
but is appealling from the motion to reconsider the granting 
of the default. Defendant is not, as the Court's opinion 
seems to indicate, asking for a new trial but is only asking 
for a new hearing before the trial court to determine whether 
the judgment should be set aside. 
Such a hearing would allow sufficient cross examina-
tion and evidence to be made part of the record so that 
the trial court can adequately evaluate the correct grounds 
of appeal based upon the appellant's former counsel's gross 
neglect and negligence which was not before it at the first 
hearing. A hearing on a Rule 6OB Motion (where a judgment 
has been entered) is hardly the equivalent of a new trial 
(where both sides are able to go into the proceeding with 
a clean slate). 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the affidavits 
filed in this case are not made solely by the losing party, 
Glen Van Tassell. Robert Sykes, a practicing and licensed 
lawyer in the state of Utah who was associated with one of 
the appellant's former counsel, substantiates the affidavit 
of the defendant. Some weight must be given to the axiom 
that Lawyers are reluctant to testify against one another 
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unless there is some extreme reason compelled by basic 
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attorney filed motions for summary judgment against Slavens. 
No objections were filed on behalf of Slavens. Several 
months later a new attorney was retained by Slavens who 
filed an amended pleading together with an affidavit. 
The trial court held that because there did not appear in 
the record to be any justification for Slavens failure to 
appear at the deposition and produce the documents he would 
order Slavens1 answer to be strickened and his default en-
tered. This court in reversing the trial court's decision 
and the entry of the default judgment stated 
"Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law 
is the principal that reason and justice shall 
prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled 
will of any one person; and that this applies 
to all men in every status: to courts and 
judges, as well as to monarchs and magistrates. 
The meaning of the term "discretion" itself 
imports that the action should be taken within 
reason and good conscience in the interest of 
protecting the rights of both parties and 
serving the ends of justice. It has always 
been the policy of our law to resolve doubts 
in favor of permitting parties to have their 
day in court on the merits of a controversy. 
Similarly, appellant, Van Tassell, would urge that his 
failure to appear at trial and to answer the interrogatories 
was no different than Slavens1 failure to appear at a depo-
sition and that both men had no counsel of record at the 
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time of crucial proceedings involving the merits of their 
case. The only difference between the Slavens case and 
this case is that Slavens was lucky enough to obtain coun-
sel who established some record in the district court 
before going on appeal. In the instant case, however, 
appellant, Van Tassell, was not so lucky and was forced to 
submit affidavits to this court to consider under its equity 
power. This Court too has "discretion" in allowing at 
least a hearing on the Motion to Set Aside the Default so 
that the truth of the previous delays can be adjudicated. 
The Michelson case is also appropriate for this court 
to consider. In that case an answer was filed by the defen-
dant. Approximately five pre-trial conferences were scheduled 
but none were attended for various reasons. On March 21st 
counsel for the defendant withdrew and counsel for the 
plaintiff served notice to the defendant to obtain new 
counsel. On April 5th no one appeared at the pre-trial 
conference and the court continued the matter without date. 
On April 10th the counsel for plaintiff notified the defen-
dant that the conference scheduled for April 12th had been 
cancelled and that the judge would reschedule the hearing. 
On November 11th the counsel for plaintiff mailed a notice 
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of readiness for trial to the defendants and on December 
10th the court set the matter for pre-trial on January 3rd, 
On this date the counsel for plaintiff appeared at the 
pre-trial but the defendants did not appear and the case 
was set for trial on January 22, 19 75. Notice of the 
trial setting was mailed by the clerk on January 14, 1975. 
At trial only the plaintiff and his counsel appeared at 
trial. Testimony was given and judgment rendered against 
the defendants in the amount of $20,000 principal and $4,000 
interest. 
After the default judgment had been taken, the 
defendant moved for a new trial and filed affidavits 
showing the circumstances of his being unavailable at 
the trial. The trial court denied the motion for a new 
trial and an appeal was taken. The majority of this court 
remanded the case to the district court stating "it seems 
to us in view of all the circumstances in this matter that 
the court abused its discretion in trying ' to set aside 
the judgment". 
The failure of Michelson to attend his trial is no 
different from Van Tassell's failure except that the 
record for such failure in Michelson was presented before 
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the trial court and not before this Court. Once again, 
Michelson was lucky in having competent trial counsel who 
established the lower court record and who did not actually 
cause the entry of default. 
A fact this Court should also consider in its equity 
power is that the judgment entered in the present appeal 
greatly exceeds both Michelson and Carman since it involves 
over $300,000 in affirmative damages against the appellant 
and a loss of at least $200,000 from valid claims appellant 
has against the respondent. 
There has been no showing of prejudice to the plaintiff-
respondent if the district court is given an opportunity to 
review the circumstances surrounding the failure to attend 
the trial and to answer the interrogatories. Certainly, 
when this much money is involved and there are affidavits 
and statements of lawyers in the record supporting defen-
dants1 contention that he was misrepresented and misled 
by his counsel and cases from other jurisdictions granting 
relief from gross neglect of a litigant's counsel, a 
remand to the district court is, as Justice Crockett in 
the Carman case stated, "within reason and good conscience 
in the interest of protecting the rights of both parties 
in serving the ends of justice". 
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Appellant would respectfully submit that this Court 
reconsider its previous opinion in light of the fact that 
a new trial is not being sought and that appellant is only 
seeking an opportunity to have an "evidentiary hearing" 
concerning the circumstances surrounding the record at the 
time the trial court denied the motions to set aside the 
default judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Ey, (orm •£ ($MU 
Craig S. Cook 
-i n~ 
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